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Abstract
Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers
auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches
and the users’ low tolerance for search result latency, it is imperative to resolve these auctions fast.
Current approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to achieve fast winner determination,
which is the problem of allocating slots to advertisers so as to maximize the expected revenue given the
advertisers’ bids. The goal of our work is to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing advertisers
to achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and scalable techniques for winner de-
termination. We also discuss the application of our framework to advertising in massively multiplayer
online games.
1. Introduction
With the number of Internet searches performed every day, search result pages have become a thriving
advertising platform. The results of a search query are presented to the user as a web page that contains
a limited number of slots, typically between four and twenty, for advertisements. On each search result
page, the major search engines, like Google and Yahoo, sell these slots to advertisers via an auction
mechanism that charges an advertiser only if a user clicks on his ad. Most of Google’s multi-billion dollar
revenue, and more than half of Yahoo’s revenue, comes from these so-called sponsored search auctions
[8]; and this market is growing quickly – by 2008, spending by US firms on sponsored search is expected
increase by $3.2 billion from 2006 and will exceed $9.6 billion, the amount spent on all of online
advertising in 2004 [9]. With the increasing market size in mind, it is natural to approach sponsored
search auctions from a database perspective in order to tackle issues of scalability and expressiveness.
Our paper is a first step in this direction.
Sponsored search auctions currently work as follows:
1. Bid submission. Advertisers submit bids on clicks for certain keywords offline.
2. User search. A user submits a search query.
3. Winner determination. Slots are assigned to advertisers by the search provider based on the
advertisers’ bids.
4. User action. The search result page is returned to the user who may now click on one or more of
the sponsored links.
5. Pricing and payment. The search provider charges an advertiser according to some pricing rule
if the user clicked on the advertiser’s sponsored link.
The speed of the winner determination in Step 3 is crucial because it contributes to the user-experienced
latency since the winning ads are displayed on the search result page returned to the user. In current spon-
sored search auctions, this winner determination can be done quickly because advertisers are limited to
submitting a single bid on whether or not the user clicks on their ad.
1.1. The Need for Expressive Auctions
Unfortunately, as we now point out, the limited bidding in current sponsored search auctions is insuf-
ficient to meet advertisers’ needs in two respects.
Bidding on Multiple Features. Once the advertisers’ ads are displayed on the search results page, the
user who submitted the query may click on the ad and may even make a purchase as a result. Advertisers
clearly value purchases because they represent immediate revenue. They also value clicks on their ads
because they indicate potential customers. However, even if the user does not click on or buy something,
advertisers might place value on having their ads displayed simply because this increases their chance
to make an impression on the customer. Advertisers who value brand awareness may wish their ads to
be placed in prominent positions. Such advertisers may prefer their ads to be displayed near the top or
bottom of the list, but not in the middle. Other advertisers whose goals are to be perceived as the leaders
in their markets may wish their ads to be displayed in the topmost slot or not displayed at all. Thus it is
clear that advertisers have valuations on clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
Unfortunately, in current search advertising platforms, advertisers are restricted to bidding only on
whether they receive a click on their ad. We call this a single-feature auction since the advertisers can
express their valuations on only one feature, namely, receiving a click. Our goal is to support multi-
feature auctions that would allow advertisers to express valuations on multiple features, namely, clicks,
purchases, and slot positions. Extending bidding to multiple features is non-trivial; whereas previously
the advertiser submitted a single value as depicted in Figure 1, now the advertiser can submit a whole
table of values for the different combinations of features, as depicted in Figure 2. The fast algorithms
for winner determination that are currently used by Google and Yahoo! do not extend to non-trivial
multi-feature auctions. Moreover, even for single-feature auctions, these algorithms can correctly deal
with only a restricted situation, namely, one where the expected number of clicks on an ad is “separable”
into the product of an advertiser-specific factor and a slot-specific factor.
Dynamic Bidding Strategies. The language that search providers, such as Google and Yahoo, cur-
rently use to let advertisers express bidding preferences in is rather limited. While the language does
allow advertisers to specify a limited number of parameters to constrain their bids (such as a daily bud-
get, and geographic targets), the language is often insufficiently expressive for serious advertisers to
express their preferences and how they change over time. To deal with this, advertisers employ the ser-
vices of various third-party search engine management companies (such as iProspect, SureHits, Atlas,
etc.) that monitor the outcomes of auctions and periodically resubmit bids on behalf of the advertiser in
an attempt to approximate the advertisers’ preferences as much as possible. The kinds of goals that they
try to achieve include maintaining a specified slot position during certain hours of the day, maintaining a
slot position above a specified competitor, and equalizing the return on investment (ROI) across multiple
keywords.1 The success of such search engine management companies demonstrates the desire among
advertisers for more complex expressive bidding in search auctions. Again, advertisers want these, but
can only pick from a set of pre-defined strategies that these companies provide.
1.2. Our Framework
With the increasing market size in mind, our goal is to design a framework that allows huge numbers
of advertisers to bid on a richer set of features using dynamic bidding strategies while simultaneously
allowing the search provider to determine winners quickly so as not to detract from the user experience
[4].
Bidding Language. In this paper, we propose a simple but rich language for bidding that allows ad-
vertisers to express their high-level strategies directly; we allow users to submit their dynamic strategies
as bidding programs that can bid on multiple features of the auction outcome, such as purchases and
slot positions, in addition to clicks. Programs take as input the search query and various statistics about
auction history and performance, and they output bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions. Using
this language gives advertisers direct and fine-grained control over their advertising strategies instead
of simply picking from a menu of pre-defined goals, as is currently done. Thus, in our framework, the
search auctions work as follows:
1. Program submission. Advertisers submit a bidding program to bid on their behalf.
2. User search.
3. Program evaluation. The programs are run and place bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
4. Winner determination.
5. User action.
6. Pricing and payment.
Scalable Algorithms. In addition to proposing our language, we propose an algorithm to perform
fast winner determination for multi-feature auctions where the advertiser can bid on clicks, purchases,
and slot positions simultaneously, under the assumption that the conditions that determine an advertiser’s
preferences satisfy a condition that can be viewed as a generalization of separability; moreover, we prove
that this requirement is in a sense necessary. We then propose techniques for reducing the amount of
work that needs to be done when evaluating dynamic strategies of many advertisers. This results in a
scalable infrastructure for multi-feature auctions with dynamic strategies.
Application to Advertising in Games. Our algorithms are applicable to more than just web search.
Massively multiplayer online games are becoming are starting to become a very successful advertising
platform. Games have unique benefits over web search for advertising because of the sense of immersion
that the player feels, and because of the well-defined and self-contained social networks present in
games that can allow advertisers to target specific market segments. Furthermore, we describe how to
leverage existing technology built into most games to accurately track ad prominence and exposure,
1In Section 2.3, we revisit the dynamic ROI equalizing strategy and illustrate how we can implement such a complex
real-world bidding strategy in our framework.
and to implement a novel ad “bookmarking” system. We discuss these issues and describe how to our
advertising framework for web search can be adapted to advertising in massively multiplayer games.
Summary of our contributions. In this paper, we approach sponsored search auctions from a
database perspective, and tackle issues of scalability and expressiveness. Our main contribution is an ef-
ficient and scalable infrastructure that permits much more expressive bidding than is currently available.
Our framework consists of:
• A language for expressing dynamic bidding strategies for multi-feature sponsored search auctions
(Section 2),
• An efficient, scalable, and parallelizable algorithm to solve winner determination for bids in our
language (Section 3),
• Techniques to reduce the amount of work necessary for evaluating dynamic strategies for multiple
advertisers (Section 4).
We evaluate our techniques experimentally in Section 5, we discuss the application of advertising
auctions to massively multiplayer games in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.
2. Bidding Strategies as Programs
In this section, we formalize the notion of bidding on multiple features, and we propose a simple
language for dynamic strategies that bid on these features.
2.1. Multiple Features
Recall that traditionally an advertiser could only bid on one property of the outcome, namely, whether
his ad received a click. Now we would like to allow advertisers to bid on additional properties as well,
namely whether a purchase was made, and whether his ad was displayed within a desired set of slots.
To each advertiser, we make available the following predicates that indicate whether or not the outcome
has one of these desired properties.
1. Slotj , indicating that the advertiser gets slot j, for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with k being the number of
slots.
2. Click, indicating that the user clicked on the advertiser’s ad.
3. Purchase, indicating that the user made a purchase via a link from the advertiser’s ad.
Conceptually, the advertiser associates a value with each truth assignment to these predicates, as depicted
in Figure 2. However, the size of such a representation is exponential in the number of predicates. So we
represent bids as OR-bids on Boolean combinations of predicates instead. That is, we let the advertiser
fill in a Bids table where each row corresponds to a Boolean formula of predicates and the amount that he
is willing to pay should that formula be true. If multiple formulas are true, the advertiser can be charged
the sum of the corresponding amounts. For example, the Bids table depicted in Figure 3 indicates that
the advertiser is willing to pay 5 cents if he gets a purchase; 2 cents if his ad is displayed in either
positions 1 or 2; and 7 cents if he gets a purchase and his ad is displayed in positions 1 or 2.
Click value
Y 3
Figure 1. Single-feature valuation
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Figure 2. Multi-feature valuation
2.2. Dynamic Strategies
As we said, we are interested in designing a programming language that lets advertisers express more
complex preferences, which may change over time. Instead of providing advertisers with a pre-defined
selection of advertising strategies, we let the advertisers submit their bidding strategies as programs for
the search provider to run. Conceptually, each time a user submits a search query to the search provider,
these programs are triggered. The main purpose of these programs is to output bids on clicks, purchases,
and slot positions that may result from displaying their ad on the search result page. In order to do
so, each program creates a Bids table as described in Section 2.1 each time there is a sponsored search
auction. These programs have access to several variables pertinent to the current auction and to the
advertiser, such as the keywords in the search query, the time of day, the advertiser’s remaining budget,
the current return on investment for the keywords that the advertiser is interested in, and so on. These
variables are stored in tables, some of which are read-only shared between all advertisers (such as the
time and location of the search) and some of which are private to each advertiser (such as information
about the keywords that the advertiser is interested in). The programs can then be written using simple
SQL updates without recursion and side-effects. SQL triggers can be used to activate programs when
an auction begins and to notify programs if they received a slot, click, or purchase. Programs can
modify their private tables, although commonly used variables, such as amount spent, budget remaining,
return on investment for various keywords, etc. can be automatically maintained for each program by
the search provider. For example, the advertiser-specific variables related to keywords are stored in a
Keyword table, as depicted in Figure 4 that is private to each advertiser. Each tuple in the Keyword table
corresponds to a bid for a keyword that the advertiser is interested. The attributes of the tuple contain,
among other things, the formula for the bid, keyword’s relevance score in the search query, the return
formula value
Purchase 5
Slot1 ∨ Slot2 2
Figure 3. Bids table
text formula maxbid roi bid relevance
boot Click ∧ Slot1 5 2 4 0.8
shoe Click 6 1 8 0.2
Figure 4. Keywords table
on investment that this keyword has provided the advertiser, the maximum amount that the advertiser
is willing to bid on a click by a user who searched for this keyword, and the amount of money that the
advertiser is currently bidding for the keyword. The search provider updates the return on investment
for a keyword each time a user searches for the keyword and then clicks on the advertiser’s ad. The
bidding program should be stored with its private tables to increase locality. Since the bidding programs
use their own private tables and read-only shared tables, they do not interact with each other when they
are triggered by a new search query. Hence they can be distributed across several machines and run in
parallel if necessary.
2.3. An Example: Equalizing ROI
We now give a concrete example of a dynamic bidding strategy that bids on multiple features. Our
example combines the dynamic ROI equalizing heuristic mentioned in Section 1 with bidding on two
features – clicks and the top slot; the advertiser is interested in receiving clicks for two keywords, “boot”
and “shoe”, but also wants to be perceived as the leading supplier of boots and so would be willing to
pay extra to be shown in the top slot if the search query is highly relevant to boots. In order to control
his spending, the advertiser has a target spending rate that he wishes to maintain. The ROI equalizing
heuristic, as suggested in [5], tries to dynamically allocate spending across the different keywords and
bids so as to maximize the advertiser’s “bang for the buck”. If the advertiser is underspending (i.e., his
current spending rate is lower than his target spending rate), then the advertiser increases the bids on
keywords that have been most profitable for him (i.e., those with the highest return on investment). If
the advertiser is overspending (i.e., his current spending rate is higher than his target spending rate), then
the advertiser decreases the bids on keywords that have been least profitable for him (i.e., those with the
lowest return on investment). Return on investment of a bid is the total value gained from the keyword
(e.g., number of clicks received in the top slot times the amount the advertiser values a click in the top
slot) divided by the amount spent so far on it.
1 CREATE TRIGGER bid AFTER INSERT ON Query
2 {
3 IF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate
4 THEN
5 UPDATE Keywords
6 SET bid = bid + 1
7 WHERE roi =
8 ( SELECT MAX( K.roi )
9 FROM Keywords K )
10 AND relevance > 0 AND bid < maxbid
11 ELSEIF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate
12 THEN
formula value
Click ∧ Slot1 4
Click 0
Figure 5. Bids table for Example Program
13 UPDATE Keywords
14 SET bid = bid - 1
15 WHERE roi =
16 ( SELECT MIN( K.roi )
17 FROM Keywords K )
18 AND relevance > 0 AND bid > 0;
19 ENDIF;
20
21 UPDATE Bids
22 SET value =
23 ( SELECT SUM( K.bid )
24 FROM Keywords K
25 WHERE K.relevance > 0.7
26 AND K.formula = Bids.formula )
27 }
A detailed explanation of this program follows. Line 1 creates a trigger that waits for a new query to
be inserted into the Query table, indicating that a new auction is taking place. If the advertiser notices
that he has been underspending (line 3), he increases his tentative bids for all relevant keywords that have
provided him with the highest return on investment, taking care not to increase the bid past its maximum
value (lines 5 - 11). Similarly, if he notices that he has been overspending (line 12), he decreases his bids
for all relevant keywords with the lowest return on investment, taking care not to decrease the bid below
zero (lines 14 - 20). Next, he updates the values in the Bids table with the sum of his tentative bids for
the corresponding formulas for all sufficiently relevant keywords, namely, those with a relevance score
higher than 0.7 in the user-submitted search query (lines 21 - 26). For example, if the Keywords table is
as depicted in Figure 4 after running lines 1 - 20, then the output Bids table will be as depicted in Figure
5.
3. Winner Determination
Having empowered the advertisers with a language for expressing dynamic bidding strategies to bid
on a rich set of features, we now seek efficient and scalable techniques for the search provider to perform
winner determination.
All sponsored search auction mechanisms currently in use (see, for example, [1, 2, 8, 22]) first solve
the winner determination problem, then assign slot positions according to the winning allocation, and
finally use some method of charging prices for the positions, such as charging each advertiser their
social opportunity cost (this is known as Vickrey pricing [7, 13, 23]), or charging advertiser in the kth
slot the amount bid by the next-highest bidder (this is known as generalized second-pricing [8]). Note
that with most pricing schemes, a provider’s revenue is not the revenue that is computed in the winner
determination problem. Different pricing schemes lead to different behavior of the auction in terms
of revenue, stability, and other economic and game-theoretic properties. For example, Vickrey pricing
leads to theoretically stable truthful auctions [23], while generalized second pricing leads to locally
envy-free equilibria [8]. Nevertheless, the first step in all these auctions is to do winner determination.
Furthermore, given winner determination as a subroutine, the pricing schemes used in these auctions
(i.e., Vickrey pricing, generalized second-pricing, etc.) can all be expressed as very simple computations.
In our work, therefore, we focus on optimizing the winner determination computation.
3.1. How Winner Determination Works
The winner determination problem is to compute the allocation of slots to advertisers that results in the
highest expected revenue for the search engine provider, under the assumption that advertisers actually
pay what they bid. In keeping with Google and Yahoo policy, we restrict the slot allocations to those in
which no advertiser gets assigned more than one slot. This prevents extremely wealthy advertisers from
monopolizing all the available slots.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an allocation, we need the advertisers’ bids
on clicks, purchases, and slot positions as specified in their Bids tables. For now, let us assume, that we
actually run all of the advertisers’ bidding programs to get their resulting Bids tables. In Section 4, we
will give techniques that will require us to run only a small subset of programs under certain conditions.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an allocation, we also need the probabilities
that the formulas in the Bids tables are true in the final outcome. We thus consider the set of all possible
outcomes that describe which slot was allocated to which advertiser together with which advertisers
received clicks and purchases. The probabilities of clicks and purchases depend on the search provider’s
allocation of slots to advertisers. For example, ads placed near the top are more likely to be noticed and
clicked on than those placed in the middle of the page [19]. As a reasonable first order of approximation,
we assume that, for each advertiser, the probability that the advertiser gets a click depends only on the
slot allocated to him, and that the probability that he gets a purchase depends only on whether he got
a click and on the slot allocated to him. Furthermore, we assume that the search provider has (or can
estimate, using data it has collected) these click and purchase probabilities for each advertiser and each
slot allocation to that advertiser.2
3.2. Complexity
Given the assumptions on slot allocations and distributions above, we look at the complexity of solv-
ing the winner-determination problem given bids in our language. Recall that a bidding program’s output
is an OR-bid represented by a Bids table whose rows contain bids of the form “Pay $d1 for E1”, . . . ,
“Pay $dm for Em”, where E1, . . . , Em are Boolean combinations of the Slotj , Click, and Purchase pred-
icates. Recall that, in addition, we assume that for any allocation, we have a distribution on outcomes,
conditional on that allocation. Each formula Ei can be identified with an event on the set of possible
outcomes, namely, the set of outcomes in which Ei is true. Thus bidding on formulas can be interpreted
2Note that a complete representation of the probabilities of all possible formulas for each advertiser would be exponential
in the number of features. Although this is not too large in our setting, the complete set of probabilities should be stored in
a database separate from the run-time system which itself should only store probabilities for the formulas mentioned in the
bidding programs and Keyword tables since these are the only probabilities that are used. Furthermore, the probabilities can
be partitioned by advertiser and should be stored with the advertiser’s bidding program and private tables to improve locality.
as bidding on events. Toward proving that winner determination is tractable for bids in our language, we
introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 (m-dependent event) An event is m-dependent if there are at most m advertisers such that
probability of the event given any allocation depends only on the placement of those m advertisers.
That is, an event is m-dependent if it is independent of the slots assigned to all but m advertisers.
For example, the event that a given advertiser gets a click is 1-dependent since we assumed that the
probability of an advertiser getting a click depends only on the slot position of that advertiser. Similarly,
the event that a given advertiser is in either the top slot or the bottom slot is 1-dependent since it depends
only on the slot assigned to that advertiser. However, given two advertisers, the event that one gets the
top position and the second gets the bottom is 2-dependent since it depends on the slots assigned to both
those advertisers.
We assume that the representation of each m-dependent event includes the labels of the m advertisers
on whose slot assignment the event depends. The following theorem says that winner determination is
tractable for 1-dependent events.3
Theorem 2 For OR-bids on collections of 1-dependent events, the winner determination problem is in
polynomial time.
As a corollary, we see that, winner determination for the bids represented by our Bids tables can
be solved in polynomial time since it follows from our assumptions in Section 3.1 that any Boolean
combination of predicates for an advertiser (i.e., of the form Slot1, . . . , Slotk, Click, Purchase) is 1-
dependent.
A natural question to ask is whether we can extend our tractability results to a language that allows
advertisers to bid on m-dependent events, for m ≥ 2. The next result says that winner determination
is APX-hard if we allow bids to be placed on 2-dependent events, such as the event that one advertiser
is displayed above another. APX is the class of NP optimization problems that have polynomial-time
constant-factor approximation algorithms [14].
Theorem 3 For OR-bids on collections of 2-dependent events, the winner-determination problem is
APX-hard.
In the remainder of this section, we take the reader on a quest for an efficient and scalable winner
determination algorithm for our bidding language.
3.3 Existing Allocation Algorithms
The allocation algorithms used by Google and Yahoo, as well as those studied in the literature [2, 1, 8,
22], deal with the issue of scalability by assuming that the probability of a click resulting from assigning
a slot to an advertiser is separable, that is, it can be written as the product of an advertiser-specific factor
and a slot-specific factor. To illustrate this notion of separability, we provide examples of separable and
non-separable click probabilities in Figures 7 and 6 respectively. The matrix in Figure 7 is separable
because the entries in the matrix can be split into the product of advertiser-specific factors (namely, 4 for
Nike and 3 for Adidas) and slot specific-factors (namely, 0.2 for slot 1, and 0.1 for slot 2).
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.7 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
Figure 6. Non-separable click probabilities
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.8 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
Figure 7. Separable click probabilities
When the click probabilities are separable, it is easy to see that winner determination can be performed
by assigning the advertisers with jth highest advertiser-specific factor to the slot with the jth highest
slot-specific factor. This can be done in time O(n log k).
Note that the assumption of separability implicitly assumes that the event that an advertiser gets a
click is 1-dependent. Indeed, it assumes the event that an advertiser gets a click depends on only that
advertiser’s slot assignment. But separability requires much more 1-dependence: it requires that the
ratio of the expected number of clicks on one advertiser in a slot and the expected number of clicks on
another advertiser in the same slot is the same for all slots.
Not only is separability a much stronger requirement than 1-dependence, but the techniques for fast
winner determination using this assumption do not suffice to deal with our bidding language. In particu-
lar, they cannot deal with the types of situations described in Section 1 where one advertiser wants to be
displayed in the top slot or not displayed at all, while another advertiser wants to be displayed in either
the top or bottom slots but not in the middle slots. (Bids representing these preferences can be easily
expressed in our language.)
3.4. Maximum-Weight Bipartite Matching
We proved Theorem 2 by showing that winner determination in this case is equivalent to maximum-
weight bipartite matching between advertisers and slots, where the edge-weight between an advertiser
and a slot is the expected revenue obtained by assigning that slot to that advertiser. The fastest known
(non-parallel) algorithm to solve this is the Hungarian algorithm, invented by Kuhn [16] (also known as
the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm after being revised by Munkres [17]); it finds the best matching in time
O(nk(n + k)) where n is the number of advertisers and k is the number of slots. Since this is quadratic
in n, this will not scale well. We want to deal with situations where n can be quite large (possibly in
tens to hundreds of thousands). To make the problem scalable, we need it to be linear in n, the number
of advertisers. There are parallel algorithms for maximum-weight matching [11], but these require
prohibitively large numbers (typically Ω(n2)) of processing units in order to achieve linear running time.
3.5. Our Algorithm
We now give a scalable winner-determination algorithm that takes advantage of the fact that k, the
number of slots, is quite small (say less than 20) compared to n, the number of advertisers. Indeed, n
3See appendix for proofs.
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 9 5
Adidas 8 7
Reebok 7 6
Sketchers 7 4
Figure 8. Revenue matrix Figure 9. Bipartite graph Figure 10. Reduced graph
is growing rapidly every year while k remains the same. We can modify the Hungarian algorithm to
get a O(nk log k + k5) algorithm by considering only those advertisers whose values are in the top k
highest for some slot. That is, for each slot, we consider the k advertisers who would produce the top k
expected revenue if placed in that slot. We take the union of these advertisers over all the k slots, and
consider the bipartite subgraph containing only these advertisers along with all the k slots. We then solve
maximum-weight bipartite matching problem for this reduced bipartite graph. As an example, consider
the expected revenue matrix as depicted in Figure 8. There are two slot positions available and four
advertisers. The top two expected revenues for the first slot come from Nike and Adidas, while the top
two expected revenues for the second slot come from Adidas and Reebok. The corresponding edges in
the original bipartite graph between advertisers and slots have been depicted in bold in Figure 9. This
bipartite graph is then reduced to contain only those advertisers with an adjacent bold edge as depicted in
Figure 10. We observe that the maximum matching for the original problem must occur for this smaller
problem since if an maximum matching in the original problem assigned a slot to an advertiser who was
not in the top k highest bidders for that slot, we can simply reassign that slot to one of these top k bidders
who is not assigned any slot. Note that since there are only k − 1 other slots, at least one advertiser in
the top k is guaranteed to remain unassigned.
Finding the relevant advertisers takes time O(nk log k) because, for each slot, we can find the top k
bidders for that slot in time O(k + n log k) by maintaining a priority heap of size at most k. There are
at most k2 such advertisers since in the worst case we will have a distinct set of k advertisers for each of
the k slots. Hence running the Hungarian algorithm on the reduced graph takes time O(k5) for a total
running time of O(nk log k + k5) for our algorithm.
Parallelization. Our technique lends itself very well to parallelization. Note that in our setting there
is typically already a high amount of parallelized infrastructure present since the bids are collected from
advertisers in a distributed way. We construct k networks of computers each in the form of a binary tree
of height O(log n) with n leaves. We can compute a maximum matching in time O(k log n + k5) as
follows. For each slot j, we consider the jth binary tree network, which will ultimately compute the top
k bidders for that slot at the root:
1. The ith leaf node in the jth network starts out with the expected revenue from assigning slot j to
advertiser i.
2. Each internal node gathers the top k bidders (along with their corresponding bids) from its two
children, and combines them into a single list of top k bidders. This takes time O(k) for each of
the O(log n) levels of the tree since each level of the tree works in parallel.
3. The root nodes in each of the j-networks take the union of their lists of bidders and compute the
maximum-weight matching of these bidders with the k slots using the Hungarian algorithm. This
takes time O(k5) since there are k slots and at most k2 bidders considered.
Note that we can mix sequential processing with parallel processing by running more than one pro-
gram sequentially on each machine, computing the top k bids, and then aggregating using a tree net-
work as before. If we have a binary tree network with p nodes, then the total running time becomes
O(n
p
k log k + k log p + k5).
Finally, if necessary, the O(k5) part of the algorithm (i.e., the part resulting from running the Hungar-
ian algorithm on the reduced bipartite graph) can be reduced to O(k2) using a parallel algorithm, such as
in [11]. The number of parallel nodes processing units required would be O(k5), which is independent
of n.
3.6. Beyond 1-dependence
So far, our results have assumed that the probability that an advertiser receives a click or a purchase
depends only on the slot to which that advertiser was assigned. However, it is easy to think of situations
where this assumption might not be true. For example, if the slot assigned to an advertiser for a small
company is just below a very large and popular competitor, then it is likely that the competitor will
receive a substantial portion of user clicks that might otherwise have gone to the smaller advertiser had
the competitor not been present. Thus the probability of receiving a click (or a purchase) would depend
on who else displays an ad and in what position. In the worst case, the probability would depend on
the entire slot assignment. The representation of such a general probability distribution would be quite
large (O(knk)), and, conceptually, winners can be determined by a brute force algorithm that considers
each of the possible
(
n
k
)
k! assignments. This would also lead to advertisers to value two assignments
differently even if both assignments may give the advertiser the same slot. For example, consider two
assignments, both of which assign an advertiser slot 2. However, in the first assignment, slot 1 is given to
a very famous company, while in the second assignment, slot 1 is given to a relatively unknown company.
Then the advertiser in slot 2 would naturally prefer the second assignment to the first, since the famous
company poses a serious threat to the advertiser in terms of diverting away clicks. Representing such
general valuations would again require large space (O(knk−1)) in general.
Motivated by these concerns, but keeping in mind that we cannot store such huge distributions and val-
uations (since n can be very large), we propose the following model. For a given search auction, we as-
sume that the advertisers are classified into either heavyweights (the famous advertisers) and lightweights
(the relatively unknown advertisers). One way for the search provider to decide which advertisers are
heavyweights is to select those advertisers with the most clicks so far. We now allow the probability
that an advertiser gets a click (or a purchase) on the advertiser’s slot position as well as on which slot
positions have heavyweight advertisers and which slot positions have lightweight advertisers. We also
allow advertisers to place bids on which slots get heavyweights and which clots get lightweights, in
addition to placing bids on click, purchases, and slot positions as before. Thus an advertiser might bid 3
cents if he gets slot 2 and if there is a lightweight advertiser in slot 1. Advertisers could even place more
complex bids, such as bidding on having no heavyweights within 3 slot positions above or below his
slot in addition to having no more than 2 heavyweights appear anywhere else. The representation of the
probability distributions and valuations now become O(k2k−1) which does not depend on n anymore.
In order to solve the winner determination problem, we have to find an assignment of slots to advertis-
ers to maximize expected revenue (assuming advertisers pay what they bid) given these new valuations
and distributions. Suppose we knew exactly which slots get heavyweight advertisers in such a rev-
enue maximizing assignment. We call these slots heavyweight slots, and we call the remaining slots
lightweight slots. Then we can solve the winner determination problem by simply solving two disjoint
maximum-weighted bipartite bipartite matching problems: one matching the heavyweight advertisers to
the heavyweight slots, and the other matching the lightweight advertisers to lightweight slots. So if we
do this for each possible way to choose heavyweight slots, we can find the assignment that maximizes
expected revenue over all possible assignments. Moreover, the maximum-weight bipartite matching
problems for different choices of heavyweight slots can be solved independently and in parallel. There-
fore, since there are 2k ways to choose heavyweight slots, we can solve the winner determination in time
O(2k(n log k + k5)) in series, and in time O(n log k + k5) in parallel using 2k processing units, each of
which solves the lightweight and heavyweight bipartite matching for a different choice of heavyweight
slots. Note that the number of processing units required in the parallel algorithm is independent of the
number of advertisers n.
4. Reducing Program Evaluation
We have shown how to solve the winner-determination program given the bids output by programs.
However, getting these bids for a given search query requires, in the worst case, running each advertiser’s
program for that query. This itself can be quite expensive. An obvious step toward alleviating this
problem is for search providers to use their proprietary keyword matching algorithms to prune away
advertisers who are not interested in the search keywords for the current auction. However, this is not
enough if the search query contains a very popular keyword, such as “music” or “book”, where the
set of interested advertisers can still be large. In this section, we show that we can further reduce the
amount of work by taking advantage of knowledge of the structure of, and relationships between, the
advertiser’s programs. To simplify exposition, we assume that advertisers’ programs output bids on only
the formulas Click ∧ Slot1, . . . , Click ∧ Slotk. It is easy to incorporate bids on other complex formulas
involving Click and Purchase since both Click and Purchase are assumed to be 1-dependent events.
4.1 Threshold Algorithm
We start by considering a situation where the only difference between the programs used by different
advertisers is in the values of certain advertiser-specific parameters. More precisely, for each slot j ∈ [k],
suppose that each advertiser’s bids depends on a set of (numeric) parameters Xj in a monotonic way.
That is, there is a monotonic function fj : Xj → R+ that takes as input a value for each parameter in Xj
and outputs a bid for a click in slot j. We allow some subset of the parameters Yj to be advertiser-specific:
these can vary from advertiser to advertiser (e.g., the amount that they value a particular keyword,
the amount of budget remaining, etc.). Suppose further that these parameters Yj are only updated by
programs that win the auction.4 The rest of the parameters Zj = Xj \ Yj can be thought of as public
global parameters and are the same for all advertisers (e.g., the keyword scores associated with the user’s
4In Section 4.2, we will visit the case where all programs can update their state; nonetheless, restricting updates to winning
programs is not unreasonable since most useful advertiser-specific quantities (such as number of auctions won, amount spent
so far, return on investment for a given keyword, etc.) only change when the advertiser wins an auction.
search query, the time and date, the number of times the keywords in search query have appeared today).
A simple example of such a situation is where advertisers all use the same general strategy of starting
each day by bidding low and then gradually increasing their bids as the end of the day approaches.
However, they might each start with a different amount and might increase their bids at different rates.
Then the starting amounts and the rate of increase would be advertiser-specific parameters in Yj , and the
time of day would be a global parameter in Zj .
For each advertiser i and each slot j, we let the edge weight between advertiser i and slot j be
wi,j × fj(yi,j, zj) where wi,j is the probability of advertiser i getting a click in slot j, and yi,j ∈ Yj are
the values of the advertiser-specific parameters and zj ∈ Zj are the values of the global parameters.
We previously showed that we can solve the maximum-weight matching in time O(nk log k + k5).
Under the assumptions above, we can further reduce the O(nk log k) portion which finds the top k
bidders for each slot as follows. For a given slot j, we also store a list of bidders sorted by wi,j and we
incrementally maintain |Yj| lists of bidders, each sorted by one of the parameters in Yj . We can then
run the threshold algorithm [10] with these lists as input to find the top k advertisers with the highest
values of wi,j × fj(yi,j, zj). Note that we do not need to maintain lists for the parameters in Zj since all
advertisers have the same value for these parameters. Since fj was monotonic, the threshold algorithm
is instance optimal for the class of algorithms that find the advertisers with the top k values of fj(xi,j)
without making “wild guesses” (i.e., the algorithms must not access an advertiser until that advertiser
is encountered via a sequential scan of one of the lists). Instance optimality means that, for all inputs,
the threshold algorithm finds the top k values within a constant factor of the time it takes the fastest
algorithm that avoids wild guess for that particular input. Given these sets of k advertisers per slots,
we take O(k5) further time running the Hungarian algorithm for just these advertisers to compute the
winners. To maintain the sorted lists, once the k winners have been computed, we remove them from
the sorted lists, update their Yj parameters, and reinsert them into the sorted lists, which takes only
O(|Yj|k log n) time.
4.2. Logical Updates
We now consider the case where all program update their state, not just the winners. In certain
situations, it is possible to reduce the amount of work done in this case as well. Consider a situation
where many programs update their state using an operation that maintains their relative bid ordering.
For example, suppose that many bidders are using the ROI heuristic described in Section 2.3, each with
possibly different target spending rates and maximum bids. As long as certain conditions hold (namely,
the bid is above zero and the spending rate is above the target spending rate), the heuristic will decrement
its bid for a given keyword. Thus, if we can maintain a decrement list – that is, a list of programs, sorted
by their bid, that are currently decrementing their bid for a given keyword – we can avoid explicitly
decrementing each program’s bid, by instead performing a single logical decrement in constant time.
That is, the decrement list is associated with a single adjustment variable, initially zero. A program’s
bid is then the sum of the adjustment variable and the program’s original bid. Then, in order to decrement
the bids of all programs in the list, we simply decrement the adjustment variable. The sorted order is
maintained because all programs in the list adjust their bids by the same amount.
Of course, eventually the ROI heuristic will stop decrementing its bid and start to increment it (if
its spending rate drops below the target spending rate) or keep its bid constant (if its bid reaches zero)
instead. At this point we must move the program to an increment list or a constant list as appropriate
(similar to a decrement list, except that the adjustment variable respectively increments or remains con-
stant). At first glance, this would seem to involve checking checking the conditions for each program at
every auction. However, we observe that such conditions can often be reduced to waiting for a shared
monotonic variable (such as time, or the number of times a given keyword has occurred) to reach a
critical value. For example, in the ROI heuristic, the spending rates of losing programs decreases with
time since their amount spent remains constant. We can thus compute the earliest “critical” time in the
future that a program would have to stop decrementing and start incrementing assuming it continued to
lose. Similarly, we can compute the minimum number of auctions containing a given keyword necessary
before its bid would be decremented to zero and it would have to remain constant at zero. We can thus
maintain a list of triggers, sorted by critical value, that when activated move a bidding program to either
the increment, decrement, or constant lists as appropriate and insert the appropriate new triggers. In this
way, we only have to do any work for those programs that win an auction and for those losing programs
whose critical values have triggered. We evaluate this technique in our experiments section.
5. Experiments
To evaluate our fast winner determination algorithm, we compare the performance of four methods for
solving the winner determination problem. The first method (LP) solves the linear program formulation
of the winner determination problem. We can prove that this linear program is guaranteed to have
an integer optimum using a theorem of Chva´tal [6] by showing that the rows of the constraint matrix
represent the maximal cliques of a perfect graph. The second method (H) uses the Hungarian algorithm
in a straightforward way to compute the maximum-weight bipartite matching in the bipartite graph
with advertisers on the left and slots on the right, where the weight of an edge from an advertiser to
a slot is the expected revenue from assigning that slot to that advertiser. The third method (RH) is
our winner determination technique from Section 3.5, which first reduces the bipartite graph before
using the Hungarian algorithm. The fourth method (RHTALU) augments the third with the techniques
for reducing program evaluation from Section 4 using the threshold algorithm together with logical
updates with triggers. We used 15 slots in all cases and ran 100 auctions. For simplicity, search queries
were generated at a constant rate, each containing one keywords chosen uniformly at random out of 10
keywords. That chosen keyword was given a relevance score of 1 for that query, while other keywords
had a relevance score of 0. All bidders used the ROI heuristic described in Section 2.2. For each keyword,
the bidders’ value for a click for was generated uniformly at random between 0 and 50, conditioned on
the bidder having at a non-zero value for at least keyword. The target spending rates were chosen
uniformly at randomly between 1 and the bidder’s maximum value over all keywords. The interval
[0.1, 0.9] was partitioned into 15 disjoint intervals, with the (j + 1)-highest interval associated with slot
j. The probability of a given advertiser getting a click in a given slot was generated uniformly at random
within that slot’s interval. We used a slight generalization of generalized second-pricing to charge the
advertisers who received clicks. The entire auction system, as well as the bidder’s programs, were
implemented in C++. We used the GNU Linear Programming Kit to solve the linear program via the
simplex method.5 We ran the experiments on an AMD Athlon 64 3800+ processor with 1GB of RAM.
Figure 11 shows, for each of the four methods, the time average taken per auction, over a sequence
of 100 auctions, as we increase the number of bidders. We observed roughly an order of magnitude
improvement of the Hungarian method over naive linear programming solution, and further order of
5We found that the library’s interior point method was much slower than the simplex method for our workloads.
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magnitude improvement using our reduced bipartite graph technique. Figure 12 compares the perfor-
mance of methods RH and RHTALU in more detail. It plots the average time taken per auction, over a
sequence of 1000 auctions, as we increase the number of bidders. We observe that our techniques for
reducing program evaluation from from Section 4 give a significant further improvement in performance.
6. Advertising in MMOGs
Beyond web search, another setting to which sponsored ad auctions can be applied is massively multi-
player online games (MMOGs). In-game advertising in these games could prove to be a highly effective
advertising platform – recent studies that included eye tracking have shown that 75% of gamers engage
with at least one ad per minute across most, but not all, game types; 81% of gamers engage at least
every other minute [12]. Advertising in the form of product placement and in-game billboards is already
making their way into the current generation of games and in-game ad spending could reach $1.8 billion
by 2010 [20]. We now describe how one could adapt our sponsored search auction framework to the
auction of in-game billboards to advertisers. Product placement advertisement would work in a similar
fashion.
The billboard ads shown to a player do not have to be generated statically. The game can select which
ad to display dynamically (via an auction) just so long as it does so before the billboard is rendered on
the player’s screen. There are a number of ways to determine when to run the ad auction. For example,
it can be done just before drawing the first frame in which the billboard is visible. Or it can be done by
having the level-designer manually place trigger areas on the game map that activates the routine for ad
selection. Ideally, the trigger areas would be placed on the map so that the player would have to cross
the trigger area before the billboard comes into view. Well-developed techniques such as binary space
partitioning [21] can help to automate the process of identifying trigger areas. No matter which method
is used to determine when to run the auction, there is a requirement of fast winner determination in order
to keep the game running in real-time.
Player profile. Since the advertisements do not affect the gameplay, it would be acceptable for two
players looking at the same virtual billboard simultaneously to see different ads. Thus the game could
display different ads for different players even in a shared environment. This opens the door to targeted
advertising. Advertisers can bid differently for different player profiles. Accurate statistics about play-
ers’ in-game activities are already maintained by game servers in order to track players’ progress. These
statistic can be used to get a picture of the type of player. For example, Bartle types [3] propose four pro-
totypes: explorers, killers, achievers, and socializers. A player is given scores, called Bartle quotients,
in each of the four types. These Bartle quotients can be used by advertisers to distinguish target market
segments. For example, advertisers selling fiction books might bid higher for their ad to be displayed
to players who have high explorer quotients. Even more useful, MMOGs contain well-defined social
networks such as guilds (large groups of players who share similar goals or virtual professions), parties
(smaller groups of players who go on quests together), and personal contact lists (other players who are
friends of a player and who often socialize with the player in the game). These social networks can be
mined to predict whether or not a new player falls into a certain market segment based on whether or not
his friends and fellow guild-members do. Furthermore, all in-game chat is logged and so can be mined
for keywords that indicate potential interest in the products that the advertisers sell. Of course, the extent
to which the social networks and chat transcripts can be used to build the player profile for advertisers is
subject to the privacy policies of the game. However, one could well imagine ad-supported versions of
the game that allow players to play for free provided they agree to sharing their in-game social data with
advertisers.
Prominence. One of the most important sources of value of virtual billboard advertising to an
advertiser comes from impressions. The location of the billboard within the virtual world can affect the
amount of impact its ads can have. Billboards places at eye-level within the gameworld tend to have
greater impact. Too many billboards cluttered together can reduce the amount of impression that an ad
makes. Beyond spatial positioning of the billboard, gameplay-related distractions present at the location
can also affect impressions. For example, if a billboard is placed in an area where there is a lot of intense
and immersive gameplay (such as combat with a monster), then the player is not likely to pay much
attention to the ad displayed on that billboard. Thus, we propose to assign each billboard a prominence
score, based on the visibility of its spatial location and on the amount of distractions present at the
location (e.g., other billboards, enemies, etc.). The prominence score can be calculated just before the
auction for a billboard (or set of billboards) begins based on the number of enemies near the billboard at
the time the player enters a trigger area, and based on the visibility the billboard would have for a player
approaching from the trigger area.
Exposure. Even if an ad is placed on a prominent billboard with few distractions around it, the player
may still not see the ad because he just happened to be facing the wrong way. In determining the amount
of exposure an ad has to a player, games have a great advantage over web search. It is very easy to
accurately measure and record various properties that directly affect an ad’s exposure. For example, one
can measure how long the ad is in the player’s field of vision, whether or not the player’s view of the ad
was obstructed by another object, what angle the ad was viewed from, whether the player was engaged
in some other activity (e.g., cycling through his inventory) while the ad was in view, etc. We propose
to combine these measurements into a single exposure score that is accumulated over the course of the
game. Note that the exposure score is known only after the player has quit the game and is therefore
uncertain at the time of the ad auction.
Engagement. Beyond measuring the exposure that virtual billboard ads provide, one may be tempted
to implement a mechanism analogous to clicks in sponsored search auctions take the player to the ad-
vertiser’s homepage in a separate browser window. However, care must be taken so as to minimize the
intrusiveness of such a mechanism on the gameplay. The mechanism should allow players to express
interest in an ad, but should not entail a substantial distraction from the immediacy of gameplay. We
propose to use the aiming/targeting system already built into these games for such a non-intrusive mech-
anism. The idea is to allow players to bookmark an ad by “shooting” at the ad. Player can “shoot” ads
more or less to indicate how much the ad interests them. Upon quitting the game, the player is then
presented with a splash screen containing the list of all the ads he bookmarked, sorted by the amount of
he engaged the ad by shooting it.
Adapting our auction framework. In this new setting of advertising on in-game billboards, the
billboards are analogous to slots. The exposure and engagement scores are similar to clicks and pur-
chases in that they are unknown at auction time, and therefore the game must maintain distributions of
exposure and engagement scores for each billboard. These distributions can be based on historical data.
An auction for a set of billboards is run when a player enters their trigger area.
As before, advertisers submit programs to bid on their behalf, and these programs are given access to
variables relevant to the player’s profile (e.g., Bartle types, guild, etc.) and to the current prominence
scores for the set of billboards. Now, instead of of bidding on slots, clicks, and purchases, these programs
output bids on billboards as well as on intervals of exposure and engagement scores. For examples, an
advertiser can bid 3 cents for the second-most prominent billboard if exposure ends up being greater
than 0.8 and engagement ends up being greater than 0.6. This would be represent by a bids table as
shown in Figure 13.
formula value
. . . . . .
Billboard2 ∧ Exp(0.8,1] ∧ Eng(0.6,1] 3
. . . . . .
Figure 13. Bids table
The game then computes winners so as to maximize the expected revenue assuming that advertisers
pay what they bid. We assume once again that the only billboard that affects the exposure and engage-
ment scores for an advertiser is the billboard to which he is assigned. Then we can use our algorithm
from Section 3 to solve winner determination efficiently. Moreover, our techniques for reducing program
evaluation from Section 2.2 still apply in this setting.
7. Conclusion
Our paper is a first step toward applying database principles to the exciting and important problems
arising in advertising auctions. In this paper, we highlight the need for more expressive bidding in
sponsored search auctions. To address this, we propose a framework that empowers advertisers with
an expressive bidding language, and we provide efficient, scalable, and parallelizable techniques for
performing winner determination given bids expressed in our language. We also described how our
techniques could be adapted to advertising in massively multiplayer online games. We believe that the
database community has much to offer this area given its vast experience with the trade-offs between
expressiveness and scalability; and providing advertisers with more expressive bidding languages while
retaining the scalability of these sponsored search auctions is crucial to the continued growth of this
multi-billion dollar industry.
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A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 Consider any bid of $d on event E where E is a 1-dependent event which depends
on the slot assigned to only one advertiser, say i. If advertisers pay what they bid, then in all outcomes
this bid contributes exactly the same amount to the revenue as the OR-bid of $d on E ∧ Sloti1, $d on
E ∧Sloti2, . . . , $d on E ∧Slotik, and $d on E ∧ (∧j¬Slotij), where Slotij is the event that advertiser i gets
slot j. This is because Sloti1, . . . , Slotik are mutually exclusive events since the allocations are restricted
to at most one slot per advertiser. We can thus fill out a table of advertisers versus slots where the entry
for the ith advertiser and the jth slot is the sum of the total expected revenue from bids on events of form
E ∧ Slotij assuming advertisers pay what they bid. If we interpret this table as the edge-weight matrix
of a bipartite graph between advertisers and slots, then the winner determination problem is the problem
of finding a maximum-weight bipartite matching for this graph, which can be done in polynomial time
[16]. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3 We will reduce the winner determination problem to the maximum-weighted feed-
back arc set problem by using bids on 2-dependent events to encode the edges in a given weighted di-
rected graphs on advertisers. Consider any weighted directed graph on n advertisers. Let wi,i′ be the
weight of the edge from advertiser i to advertiser i′. Let Slotij be the event that advertiser i gets assigned
slot j. For two advertisers i and i′, let Ei>i′ be shorthand for ∨j(Slotij ∧ ((∨j′>jSloti
′
j′) ∨ (∧j′¬Slot
i′
j′)),
which is the event that advertiser i gets a slot and is placed above advertiser i′ who may or may not get a
slot. Then Ei>i′ is a 2-dependent event since it depends on the slots assigned to advertisers i and i′. Let
each advertiser i place the following bids: for each i′ 6= i, bid wi,i′ on Ei>i′ . Then, assuming advertisers
pay what they bid, revenue of wi,i′ will be generated if and only if advertiser i is placed above advertiser
i′. Then winner determination is equivalent to the problem of finding the maximum-weighted feedback
arc set over all size-k subgraphs, which is APX-hard in n and k [14]. In fact, even when the directed
graphs are restricted to degree-3, the feedback arc set problem is still NP-hard [18, 15]. This means
that winner determination is NP-hard even when each bid is restricted to the events mentioning at most
three advertisers. So it is infeasible to allow advertisers to bid on being placed above even two or more
competitors. ¤
